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PITFALLS OF ANALYSIS AND THE ANALYSIS OF PITFALLS 
G.  Majone 
J a n u a r y  1 9 7 7  
Research Memoranda arc intcriln rcports on rcscarch hcilip, corl- 
ducted by the ~nternationai  Instit1;te for Applicd Systcn~a Analysis, 
and as such reccivc only limited scientific review. Vicws or opi11- 
ions contained herc i~ i  do l ~ o t  necessarily rcprcscnt tt~osc o f  thc 




Like scicntific research, applicd systvrns analysis is crssc.~ltially a (,ru1'1 ac-iivily; c X \ . c b ~ 1  
though it does not operate on physic.al tllir~gs a n d  ptlc~nomt.rla, bllt on inlc.llcc.tual c:onslr~~c.ts 
arising i l l  the investigation of polit:), prol)lc~ns. S~rccessi'ul anal, tic work clc:perlds crllciall\. 
on an intirnate hnowledgc of methods arld tools. and ttlc,ir lirnitatiotis, atld 011 a highly per- 
sonal relationship between thc;. arlalyst and llis task. 
The craft character of syster~ls analysis can bc seen rtlosl t-learly in Ihc to:lccpt of pitl'all. 
A pitfall is the sort of error that tlc.stroys thc solution of a probltrn arttl rlullil'ics the valiclity 
of a policy recommelldation. 
Perhaps the most reliable way o f  assc.ssing thc. nlaturitj 01' a I'ieltl of inq~liry is the cxlcril 
to which its common pitfalls arcB rt.cognizcvl. A s  ;I corlIril~tIion i o  [tic rnc.thociologica1 develop- 
ment of systems analysis. the IIASA Silrvcy IJrojec.t will publisll a mill ti-ilu lt1orc.d volun~c. 
on the limitations and pitfalls of the most c.ornmonly used analytic: tools. The, prescbnt 
paper attempts to provide a eoncc.ptua1 four~dalion for illis volulnc~. 11 is acldrcxsscd to Itlo 
practitioners as well as to the users of systthlns arlalysis. 

ABSTRACT 
The literature of applied system* has dt:voted considt*rable attention 
to  the treatment of pitfalls. The prcbsent paper extends previous dis- 
cussions in two ways: by introduci~lg a ncsw categorization of pitfalls: 
and by examining their epistemologic~al. tc~rhnical, and conct.ptua1 roots. 
Analytic pitfalls are grouped around four rubrics that closely 
correspond t o  the four components of the analytic task: a) problem 
setting. data, and information; b) tools and methods; c) evidence 
and argument; d) conclusions. communication. and implementation. 
A number of examples are discussc-d. and it is al-gued that analytic 
methods and techniques can he btst ~ll~derstood in terms of t h ~  pitfalls 
they are designed to  circumvent. 

P i t f a l l s  o f  A n a l y s i s  and  t h e  A n a l y s i s  o f  P i t f a l l s  
Giandomenico Ma j one  
* 
" I n  a n a l y s i s ,  t h e  p i t f a l l s  a r e  everywhere d e n s e "  
INTRODUCTION 
A p i t f a l l  is  a  c o n c e p t u a l  e r r o r  i n t o  which,  b e c a u s e  o f  i t s  
s p e c i o u s  p l a u s i b i l i t y ,  p e o p l e  f r e q u e n t l y  and  e a s i l y  f a l l .  I t  
i s  " t h e  t a k i n g  of a  f a l s e  l o g i c a l  p a t h "  (Koopman, 1956)  t h a t  
may l e a d  t h e  unwary t o  a b s u r d  c o n c l u s i o n s .  A p i t f a l l  i s  f o r  
t h e  n o n d e m o n s t r a t i v e  a rguments  u sed  i n  t h e  e m p i r i c a l  s c i e n c e s ,  
i n  t e c h n o l o g y ,  and  i n  sys t ems  a n a l y s i s  what t h e  f a l l a c y  i s  
f o r  t h e  d e d u c t i v e  r e a s o n i n g  o f  l o g i c  and  ma thema t i c s .  I n  b o t h  
c a s e s ,  one  h a s  t o  be  a lways  on g u a r d  a g a i n s t  h i d d e n  m i s t a k e s  
t h a t  have  t h e  power o f  d e s t r o y i n g  t h e  e n t i r e  v a l i d i t y  of  a  
c o n c ~ u s i o n .  
L o g i c i a n s  d i s t i n g u i s h  between a  f a l l a c y  and a  s i m p l e  
f a l s i t y .  A s i n g l e  s t a t e m e n t  may b e  f a l s e ,  b u t  k h a t  i s  f a l l a -  
c i o u s  i s  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  from a  se t  of  p r e m i s e s  t o  a  c o n c l u s i o n .  
S i m i l a r l y ,  i n  s y s t e m s  a n a l y s i s  p i t f a l l s  s h o u l d  c o t  be  c o n f u s e d  
w i t h  b l u n d e r s  o r  e r r o r s  t h a t  may a f f e c t ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  
n u m e r i c a l  v a l u e  o f  a  s o l u t i o n  b u t  n o t  t h e  b a s i c  s t r u c t u r e  o f  
t h e  a rgument  s u p p o r t i n g  it. 
." 
I n  l o g i c  t h e r e  i s  a t r a d i t i o n  o f  s y s t e m a t i c  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  
f a l l a c i e s  t h a t  g o e s  back t o  A r i s t o t l e ' s  D e  S o p h i s t i c ? : ~  E l e n c h i s .  
John  S t u a r t  M i l l  d e v o t e d  Book V o f  A S y s t e m  o f  L o g i c  t o  an  
a c c o u n t  and  new c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  f a l l a c i e s ,  and D e  Morgan, 
w h i l e  r e j e c t i n g  p r e v i o u s  a t t e m p t s  t o  p roduce  e x h a u s t i v e  des -  
c r i p t i o n s  o f  a l l  p o s s i b l e  t y p e s  o f  f a l l a c y ,  s t i l l  d e v o t e d  a n  
e n t i r e  c h a p t e r  o f  h i s  Formal L o g i c  t o  a p e n e t r a t i n g  a n a l y s i s  
o f  many o f  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  l i s t e d  f a l l a c i e s  (Mackie ,  1967)  . 
* 
Dictum a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  B r i t i s h  mathe- 
m a t i c i a n  A.S. B e s i c o v i t c h  ( R a v e t z ,  1973) . The r e f e r e n c e  h e r e  
is ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t o  ma thema t i ca l  a n a l y s i s ,  where a  s e t  E i s  s a i d  
t o  b e  everywhere  d e n s e  i f  e v e r y  p o i n t  o f  t h e  s p a c e  c o n t a i n i n g  E 
i s  a  l i m i t  p o i n t  o f  E .  
More r e c e n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  mainly devoted  t o  a  d i s c u s s i o n  of 
f a l l a c i e s  i n  everyday t h i n k i n g ,  a r e  Rober t  H .  T h o u l e s s ' s  How t o  
T h i n k  S t r a i g h t  (1932, new e d i t i o n  1 9 4 7 ) ,  and Susan S t e b b i n g ' s  
T h i n k i n g  t o  Some Purpose  (1939) . 
O u t s i d e  o f  l o g i c  and ph i losophy ,  t h e  amount of  a t t e n t i o n  
devo ted  t o  t h e  t o p i c  of  p i t f a l l s  v a r i e s  c o n s i d e r a b l y  among 
d i f f e r e n t  d i s c i p l i n e s .  Very few n a t u r a l  s c i e n c e s  have s t a n d -  
a r d  l i t e r a t u r e  on t h e  p o s s i b l e  p i t f a l l s  of  t h e i r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
p a t t e r n s  of  argument (Rave tz ,  1973) .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  
l i t e r a t u r e  of  s t a t i s t i c s ,  a  d i s c i p l i n e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  concerned 
w i t h  t h e  l o g i c  o f  i n d u c t i v e  r e a s o n i n g  and t h e  weighing o f  
e v i d e n c e ,  c o n t a i n s  many i n s i g h t f u l  d i s c u s s i o n s  of  p i t f a l l s ,  
b o t h  a t  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  l e v e l  ( p e r h a p s  e x e m p l i f i e d  a t  t h e i r  b e s t  
by t h e  p u b l i s h e d  d i s c u s s i o n s  of  t h e  Royal S t a t i s t i c a l  S o c i e t y )  
and a t  t h e  l e v e l  of t e x t b o o k s  and p o p u l a r  e x p o s i t i o n s  (Huff ,  
1954; W a l l i s  and Rober t s ,  1956; Reichman, 1961) .  To some 
e x t e n t ,  t h i s  t r a d i t i o n  h a s  been c a r r i e d  o v e r  i n t o  t h e  ne igh-  
b o r i n g  f i e l d  o f  economet r i c s  ( Johns ton ,  1963; Cramer, 1 9 6 9 ) ,  
b u t  it d o e s  n o t  s e e m  t o  have  p e n e t r a t e d  d e e p l y  i n t o  a c t u a l  
economet r i c  p r a c t i c e  ( S t r e i s s l e r ,  1 9 7 0 ) .  S o c i a l  s c i e n c e  
l i t e r a t u r e  r e v e a l s  o n l y  a  marg ina l  awareness  of  t h e  g e n e r a l  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  p i t f a l l s ;  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  o n l y  d e t a i l e d  
d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  t o p i c  i n  t h e  eight-volume I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
E n c y c l o p e d i a  o f  t h e  S o c i a l  S c i e n c e s ,  i s  t h e  p e r c e p t i v e  a r t i c l e  
on s t a t i s t i c a l  f a l l a c i e s  by I.J. Good ( 1 9 6 8 ) .  I n  sys tems 
a n a l y s i s ,  a  number o f  s t a n d a r d  works i n c l u d e  e x t e n s i v e  t r e a t -  
ment o f  p i t f a l l s ,  and some of  t h e s e  d i s c u s s i o n s  have a t t a i n e d  
t h e  s t a t u s  o f  minor c l a s s i c s  o f  t h e  d i s c i p l i n e  (Koopman, 1956; 
H i t c h ,  1956, 1958; Kahn and Mann, 1957; H i t c h  and McKean, 1960; 
Quade, 1968, 1 9 7 5 ) .  
Of c o u r s e ,  t h e s e  comparisons can  be  m i s l e a d i n g  i f  one i s  
n o t  c a r e f u l  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  between e x p l i c i t  awareness of  a  
pros lem and t h e  i n a r t i c u l a t e d  p r a c t i c a l  knowledge t h a t  r e s u l t s  
from l o n g  and s u c c e s s f u l  e x p e r i e n c e .  Thus, a n  e x p l i c i t  t r e a t -  
ment o f  p i t f a l l s  is less i m p o r t a n t  i n  t h e  n a t u r a l  s c i e n c e s  t h a n  
i n  o t h e r  f i e l d s  because  it i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  make p r a c t i c a l  tes ts  
o f  t h e o r e t i c a l  c o n c l u s i o n s  and because  o f  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  
e f f e c t i v e  p r o f e s s i o n a l  mechanisms t h a t  impose q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  
on r e s u l t s .  Also ,  l a b o r a t o r y  c o u r s e s  and s i m i l a r  d e v i c e s  h e l p  
t h e  s t u d e n t  d e v e l o p  a n  i n t u i t i v e  f e e l i n g  f o r  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  p i t f a l l s  i n  t h e  s t a n d a r d  p r o c e d u r e s  by which he v e r i f i e s  
t h e o r e t i c a l  r e s u l t s .  The s i t u a t i o n  p r e v a i l i n g  i n  sys tems 
a n a l y s i s  i s  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t .  Here, d i r e c t  v e r i f i c a t i o n  of  
c o n c l u s i o n s  i s  seldom p o s s i b l e ;  p r o f e s s i o n a l  mechanisms f o r  
t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  q u a l i t y  o f  a n a l y t i c  work a r e  s t i l l  i n  an  embryonic 
s t a g e ;  and t h e  approach i s  t o o  new f o r  a  wide ly  s h a r e d  t r a d i t i o n  
o f  c r i t i c a l  t h o u g h t  t o  have developed.  The s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  
t h e s e  f a c t o r s  a s  i n d i c a t o r s  o f  t h e  need o f  d i s c u s s i n g  p i t f a l l s  
i n  sys tems  a n a l y s i s  i s  i n c r e a s e d  by two o t h e r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
f e a t u r e s :  i t s  i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y  c h a r a c t e r  and t h e  myopic prag-  
matism p r e v a i l i n g  among many o f  i t s  p r a c t i t i o n e r s .  
Systems a n a l y s t s  come from t h e  most d i v e r s e  d i s c i p l i n a r y  
backgrounds, and s t u d e n t s  now a c q u i r i n g  s p e c i a l i z e d  t r a i n i n g  
a r e  exposed t o  academic c u r r i c u l a  t h a t  v a r y  from s c h o o l  t o  
s c h o o l  and,  t h a t  r e p r e s e n t  t e n t a t i v e  compromiscs among d i f f e r e n t  
i n t e l l e c t u a l  t r a d i t i o n s .  Thus, a  s o r t  of  ja rgon o r  l i n g u a  
francs has  evolved t h a t ,  because  of  i t s  composi te  c h a r a c t e r  and 
l a c k  of d e p t h ,  t e n d s  t o  mask a m b i g u i t i e s  and s u b t l e  d i f f e r e n c e s  
i n  meaning t h a t  a r e  a t  t h e  r o o t  o f  many p i t f a l l s .  For  example, 
i n  t h i s  s i m p l i f i e d  p i d g i n ,  " c o s t "  i s  o f t e n  t a k e n  t o  mean j u s t  
h i s t o r i c a l  o r  sunk c o s t ;  "average"  i s  o n l y  t h e  a r i t h m e t i c  o r  
sample average ,  even when o t h e r  pa ramete r s  a r e  a p p r o p r i a t e ;  
r a t i o s  of  b e n e f i t s  t o  c o s t s  become measures of  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  
v a l i d  under  a l l  c i r cumstances .  
Most of t h e  t e c h n i c a l  t o o l s  used i n  sys tems a n a l y s i s  have 
been developed by o t h e r  d i s c i p l i n e s ,  o f  which t h e  average  
a n a l y s t  c a r e s  t o  know o n l y  t h o s e  l i m i t e d  p a r t s  t h a t  seem most 
d i r e c t l y  a p p l i c a b l e .  But concep t s  and t e c h n i q u e s  removed from 
t h e i r  b r o a d e r  d i s c i p l i n a r y  c o n t e x t  t e n d  t o  become s t e r e o t y p e s ,  
and t h e i r  l i m i t a t i o n s  a r e  n o t  e a s i l y  p e r c e i v e d  by peop le  i n t e r -  
e s t e d  o n l y  i n  immediate u t i l i t y .  Thus o r i g i n a t e  t h e  p i t f a l l s  
t h a t  B.O. Koopman (1956) has  l a b e l e d  l i n e a r i t i s ,  m a x i m i t i s ,  and 
mechan i t i s .  I n  t h e  same way, a l l  t h e  s u b t l e t y  of  s t a t i s t i c a l  
r e a s o n i n g  i s  l o s t  i n  r i t u a l i s t i c  and o f t e n  meaningless  a p p l i c a -  
t i o n s  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  l e v e l s .  
The l i t e r a t u r e  of  systems a n a l y s i s ,  a s  a l r e a d y  i n d i c a t e d ,  
h a s  devoted  c o n s i d e r a b l e  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  t r e a t m e n t  of  p i t f a l l s .  
The p r e s e n t  paper  a t t e m p t s  t o  ex tend  p r e v i o u s  d i s c u s s i o n s  i n  
two ways: by c a t e g o r i z i n g  p i t f a l l s  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  f o u r  b a s i c  
components of a n a l y s i s  t o  b e  d i s c u s s e d  below; and by examining 
i n  some d e p t h  t h e i r  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l ,  t e c h n i c a l ,  and c o n c e p t u a l  
r o o t s ,  and p o i n t i n g  o u t  t h e i r  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  I t  w i l l  be 
a p p a r e n t  t h a t  p i t f a l l s  d i s c u s s e d  under one  heading cou ld  a l s o  
have been t r e a t e d ,  i n  some of  t h e i r  a s p e c t s  and k a m i f i c a t i o n s ,  
under  o t h e r  c a t e g o r i e s .  T h i s  i s  unavoidable  i n  any c l a s s i f i c a -  
t i o n ,  b u t  a s  long  as t h e  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  r e f l e c t s  t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  
s t r u c t u r a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  reasonab ly  w e l l ,  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  redundancy 
i s  n o t  t o o  s e r i o u s  and may even be  u s e f u l .  Before  e n t e r i n g  
i n t o  d e t a i l s ,  one  f u r t h e r  g e n e r a l  o b s e r v a t i o n  should  b e  added. 
A d i s c u s s i o n  c e n t e r i n g  on p i t f a l l s  i s  n e c e s s a r i l y  c r i t i ca l  of  
widespread methods and p r a c t i c e s .  T h i s  may l e a v e  a  n e g a t i v e  
impress ion  upon t h e  r e a d e r ,  t e n d i n g  t o  obscure  t h e  s u b s t a n t i a l  
accomplishments  o f  sys tems a n a l y s i s .  For  t h i s  r e a s o n ,  t h e  
p o s i t i v e  aim of  t h e  p r e s e n t  e s s a y  should  b e  s t r e s s e d ;  a s  Ravetz 
(1973, p .  100) w r i t e s :  
A r e c o g n i t i o n  and s y s t e m a t i c  use  of t h e  phenomenon o f  
p i t f a l l s  might  be  ve ry  e f f e c t i v e  i n  t h e  t e a c h i n g  of  
t h o s e  s imple  b u t  e s s e n t i a l  c r a f t  s k i l l s  which are 
i n v o l v e d  i n  s c i e n t i f i c ,  s c h o l a r l y ,  o r  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
work. An e x p o s i t i o n  of s t a n d a r d  t e c h n i q u e s  i n  t e r m s  
of  t h e  p i t f a l l s  t h e y  a r e  des igned  t o  c i rcumvent ,  w i t h  
examples,  c o u l d  go f a r  t o  make them meaningful  and 
o b v i o u s l y  wor th  m a s t e r i n g .  
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AS CIiAFT WORK 
The r e a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  c a t e g o r y  " p i t f a l l "  f o r  
sys tems a n a l y s i s  i s  b e s t  a p p r e c i a t e d  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  c r a f t  
a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  f i e l d .  There  i s  an unden iab le  s i m i l a r i t y  
between t h e  work o f  an a n a l y s t  and t h a t  o f  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  
c r a f t s m a n .  I n  b o t h  c a s e s ,  s u c c e s s f u l  performance depends 
c r u c i a l l y  on  an  i n t i m a t e  knowledge of  m a t e r i a l s  and t o o l s  
and on a  h i g h l y  p e r s o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  a g e n t  and 
h i s  t a s k .  Good a n a l y t i c  worlc canno t  b e  produced mechan ica l ly  
any more t h a n  h a n d i c r a f t  worlc can  be  mass-produced. " S t y l e "  
p l a y s  a s  b i g  a  r o l e  i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  v a l u e  and a c c e p t a b i l i t y  
o f  t h e  a n a l y t i c  p r o d u c t  a s  it does  i n  t h e  r e s u l t s  of  t h e  
c r a f t s m a n ' s  work. 
There  a r e  a l s o  obv ious  d i f f e r e n c e s :  t h e  c r a f t s m a n  u s e s  
c o n c r e t e  m a t e r i a l s  i n  o r d e r  t o  produce an  o b j e c t  t h a t  h a s  a n  
a p p r o p r i a t e  shape  and s e r v e s  we l l -de f ined  purposes ;  t h e  a n a l y s t ,  
on t h e  o t h e r  hand, o p e r a t e s  w i t h  d a t a ,  t e c h n i c a l  t o o l s ,  and 
models t o  produce  arguments  and recommendations. I n  s p i t e  of 
t h e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s ,  t h e  c l a s s i c a l  A r i s t o t e l i a n  a n a l y s i s  o f  
c r a f t  work can  be  u s e f u l l y  ex tended  t o  sys tems a n a l y s i s .  The 
f o l l o w i r ~ g  t r e a t m e n t  i s  p a t t e r n e d  a f  t e r  Ravetz ' s ( 19 7 3 )  p e n e t r a t -  
i n g  d i s c u s s i o n  o f . t h e  c r a f t  c h a r a c t e r  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  i n q u i r y .  
A r i s t o t l e ' s  scheme ( d e s c r i b e d  i n  h i s  Nichomachean Ethics) 
i n v o l v e s  f o u r  c o n s t i t u e n t s  ( o r  " c a u s e s " )  of  t h e  c r a f t s m a n ' s  
t a s k :  m a t e r i a l ,  e f f i c i e n t ,  f o r m a l ,  and f i n a l .  These r e f e r ,  
r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  t o  t h e  p h y s i c a l  s u b s t a n c e  t h a t  i s  worked on;  t o  
t h e  a g e n t  and t h e  t o o l s  he u s e s  i n  shap ing  it; t o  t h e  shape  
a c q u i r e d  by t h e  s u b s t a n c e ;  and - to t h e  purpose  of  t h e  a c t i v i t y - -  
i . e . ,  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a  s p e c i f i c  o b j e c t - - o r  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  
s e r v e d  by t h e  o b j e c t  i t s e l f .  With s u i t a b l e  m o d i f i c a t i o n s ,  
t h e  same scheme can be a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  a n a l y s t ' s  work. To c a r r y  
o u t  t h i s  e x t e n s i o n ,  t h e  m a t e r i a l  component shou ld  b e  i d e n t i f i e d  
w i t h  t h e  d a t a ,  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  and c o n c e p t u a l  c o n s t r u c t s  t h a t  a r e  
u s e d  i n  s e t t i n g  t h e  problem t o  b e  ana lyzed .  Too l s ,  t e c h n i q u e s ,  
and models a r e  t h e  e f f i c i e n t  components o f  t h e  a n a l y s t ' s  t a s k .  
The ' 'form" o f  t h e  t a s k  i s  an argument  i n  which e v i d e n c e  i s  
c i t e d  and from which a  c o n c l u s i o n  i s  drawn. The f i n a l  com- 
ponen t  i s  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  i t s e l f ,  w i t h  t h e  r e l a t e d  a c t i v i t i e s  
o f  communication and implementa t ion .  
A comparison between t h i s  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  a n a l y s t ' s  
work and t h e  more u s u a l  o n e s  d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  
would t a k e  u s  t o o  f a r  a f i e l d .  For  t h e  purpose  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  
d i s c u s s i o n ,  it w i l l  s u f f i c e  t o  p o i r l t  o u t  t h a t  t h e s e  o t h e r  
schemes a r e  modeled on t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  d e c i s i o n  p r o c e s s .  
Consequen t ly ,  t h e y  r e l y  p r i m a r i l y  on c a t e g o r i e s  l i k e  o b j e c t i v e s  
and c r i t e r i a ,  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  b e n e f i t s  and c o s t s ,  and c h o i c e .  
The two schemes a r e  c e r t a i n l y  n o t  i n c o m p a t i b l e ,  b u t  t h e  one 
a d o p t e d  h e r e ,  r e l y i n g  a s  it does  on  t h e  c r a f t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
o f  a n a l y t i c  work, s e e m s  b e t t e r  s u i t e d  t o  a  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  
p i t f a l l s .  Hence, t h e  p r e s e n t  t r e a t m e n t  o f  p i t f a l l s  w i l l  b e  
o r g a n i z e d  under f o u r  r u b r i c s  t h a t  c l o s e l y  c o r r e s p d n d  t o  t h e  f o u r  
components of  t h e  a n a l y t i c  t a s k :  ( a )  problem s e t t i n g ,  dat.a, 
and i n f o r m a t i o n ;  . ( b )  t o o l s  and methods; (c )  e v i d e n c e  and 
argument; (d l  c o n c l u s i o n s ,  communication, and implementa t ion .  
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Systems a n a l y s i s  i s  concerned w i t h  problem s o l v i n g ,  b u t  it 
u s u a l l y  b e g i n s  w i t h  something less s t r u c t u r e d  t h a n  a  problem, 
namely a  problem s i t u a t i o n .  T h i s  i s  an awareness  t h a t  t h i n g s  
a r e  n o t  a s  t h e y  shou ld  b e ,  b u t  w i t h o u t  a  c l e a r  i d e a  o f  how t h e y  
might  be  p u t  r i g h t .  Problem s e t t i n g  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  t r a n s l a t i o n  
o f  a  problem s i t u a t i o n  i n t o  a  p o l i c y  problem, e x p r e s s i n g  t h e  
g o a l s  t o  b e  ach ieved  and a  s t r a t e g y  f o r  t h e i r  accomplishment .  
Over looking t h e  impor tance  ( o r ,  indeed ,  t h e  v e r y  e x i s t e n c e )  o f  
t h i s  s t a g e  o f  a n a l y s i s  i s  a  p i t f a l l  whose s e r i o u s n e s s  can  be 
i n f e r r e d  from t h e  f o l l o w i n g  q u o t a t i o n  (Rein  and Schon, 1976) :  
P o l i c y  development  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  a b o u t  a  p r o c e s s  of  
problem-set t ing;  it i s  concerned w i t h  d e v e l o p i n g  new 
purposes  and new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of t h e  i n c h o a t e  s i g n s  
o f  stress i n  t h e  sys tem which d e r i v e  from t h e  p a s t  ... . 
Prob lem-se t t ing  i s  i m p o r t a n t  n o t  o n l y  because  it i s  
d i f f i c u l t  b u t  because  t h e  q u e s t i o n s  w e  a s k  s h a p e  t h e  
answers w e  g e t .  
The amount of d e t a i l  t h a t  i s  u s e f u l  a t  t h e  s t a g e  o f  problem 
s e t t i n g  i s  d i f f e r e n t  from what i s  needed i n  t h e  p h a s e  o f  a c t u a l  
problem s o l v i n g .  The a p p r o p r i a t e  s t y l e s  o f  t h i n k i n g  w i l l  a l s o  
d i f f e r  i n  t h e  two s i t u a t i o n s .  Because o f  t h e  u n s t r u c t u r e d  
c h a r a c t e r  o f  a  problem s i t u a t i o n ,  i m a g i n a t i o n ,  judgment, and 
a n a l o g i c a l  and a s s o c i a t i v e  t h i n k i n g  p l a y  a  b i g g e r  r o l e  t h a n  
r i g o r  and t e c h n i c a l  s k i l l s  (Re in  and Schon, 1976; Ravetz ,  1 9 7 3 ) .  
F o r  t h e  same r e a s o n ,  t h e  d a t a  and i n f o r m a t i o n  used i n  s p e c i f y i n g  
t h e  problem c o n c e a l  even more p i t f a l l s  t h a n  i s  t h e  c a s e  i n  sub- 
s e q u e n t  s t a g e s  o f  t h e  work. The k i n d  of  i n f o r m a t i o n  o b t a i n e d  t o  
i d e n t i f y  s o c i a l  "needsu- - fo r  i n s t a n c e ,  th rough  o p i n i o n  p o l l s  and 
a t t i t u d e  surveys--depends v e r y  much on t h e  way t h e  q u e s t i o n s  have, 
been framed. Even c e n s u s  " f a c t s "  a r e  s u s c e p t i b l e  t o  d i f f e r e n t  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  s k i l l  used  i n  d e v i s i n g  t h e  
q u e s t i o n i n g  t e c h n i q u e s .  A s  Edwards Deming (1969,  p .  656) reminds 
us,  
To s a y ,  f o r  example,  t h a t  4 . 7 %  o f  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  i s  
unemployed i s  o n l y  t o  s a y  t h a t  t h e  r e s u l t  of  a p p l y i n g  
c e r t a i n  o p e r a t i o n s  embodied i n  a  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  and t h e  
answers t h e r e t o  gave  4 .7%.  Any economis t  knows t h a t  
t h i s  number i s  s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e :  a  s i m p l e  
change i n  one  q u e s t i o n  may produce a  change o f  h a l f  a  
m i l l i o n  i n  t h e  number unemployed. 
I t  h a s  been s a i d  t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  p i t f a l l  o f  e x p e r i m e n t a l  
r e s e a r c h  i s  t h a t  o f  t o o  e a s i l y  a c c e p t i n g  r e a d i n g s  t h a t  a r e  
s t a b l e  a s  r e p o r t s  which a r e  sound. S i m i l a r l y ,  s t a b i l i t y  of  
r e p l i e s  i s  no t e s t  of  a  meaningful  q u e s t i o n .  A s  Payne (1951, 
p. 17) p o i n t s  o u t ,  " t h e  more meaningless  a  q u e s t i o n  is ,  t h e  
more l i k e l y  it i s  t o  produce c o n s i s t e n t  pe r cen t ages  when 
r e p e a t e d . "  
A more s u b t l e  t ype  of  p i t f a l l  i s  q u i t e  common i n  a t t i t u d e  
su rve y s .  I t  c o n s i s t s  i n  a t t emp t ing  t o  measure t o t a l ,  r a t h e r  
t h a n  marg ina l ,  u t i l i t i e s ,  even when on ly  marg ina l  v a l u a t i o n s  
can p rov ide  guidance  t o  policymakers.  The g e n e r a l  m i s t ake  
h e r e  i s  t h i n k i n g  t h a t  by measuring t o t a l  u t i l i t i e s  ( a t  e x i s t i n g  
p r i c e s ) ,  one  can  i n f e r  something abou t  what i s  needed t o  
change b ehav io r  ( a t  u n s p e c i f i e d  p r i c e s ) .  For f u r t h e r  d i s -  
c u s s i o n  o f  t h i s  p i t f a l l ,  w i t h  examples, see Lipsey (1975, 
pp. 171-172). 
Once t h e  p o l i c y  problem has  been s p e c i f i e d  (and a  good 
d e a l  o f  judgment i s  c l e a r l y  r e q u i r e d  t o  avo id  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  
t h a t  a r e  e i t h e r  t o o  narrow o r  t o o  b r o a d ) ,  new t y p e s  o f  d a t a  
w i l l  come i n t o  p l a y ,  and w i t h  them come new t y p e s  o f  p o s s i b l e  
p i t f a l l s .  Perhaps  t h e  most s e r i o u s  and widespread e r r o r  a t  
t h i s  s t a g e  i s  t h e  f a i l u r e  t o  r e cogn i ze  t h e  l a r g e  margin of  
e r r o r  su r round ing  a l l  socioeconomic s t a t i s t i c s .  For  example, 
a  r e p o r t e d  d r o p  of  one o r  two pe r cen t age  p o i n t s  i n  a .  c o u n t r y ' s  
g r o s s  n a t i o n a l  p roduc t  i s  g e n e r a l l y  viewed a s  a  most s i g n i f i -  
c a n t  i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  immediate government a c t i o n  i s  r e q u i r e d .  
I n  f a c t ,  n a t i o n a l  income f i g u r e s  canno t  probably  be known 
w i t h o u t  an  e r r o r  of  210 t o  515 p e r c e n t ,  and comparable 
u n c e r t a i n t i e s  a r e  p r e s e n t  i n  f o r e i g n  t r a d e ,  p r i c e ,  unemploy- 
ment, and growth s t a t i s t i c s  (Morgenstern,  1963) . 
T h i s  s t a t i s t i c a l  p i t f a l l  h a s  a  concep tua l  c o u n t e r p a r t .  
A l l  t o o  o f t e n ,  a n a l y s t s  and pol icymakers  t end  t o  f o r g e t  t h e  
c o n v e n t i o n a l  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  dependent  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  
c a t e g o r i e s  used i n  t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  of s o c i a l  phenomena. For  
i n s t a n c e ,  unemployment i s  u s u a l l y  determined i n  terms of 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h e  r e l e v a n t  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  b e n e f i t s ,  and 
"cr ime"  c l e a r l y  depends on t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  l e g a l  sys tem and 
p r e v a i l i n g  s o c i a l  conven t ions .  Hea l t h  i n d i c e s ,  l e v e l s  o f  
e d u c a t i o n ,  p u b l i c  e x p e n d i t u r e s  f o r  r e s e a r c h :  t h e s e  and a l l  
o t h e r  b a s i c  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  s o c i a l  p o l i c y  must b e  i n t e r p r e t e d  
i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  a  p a r t i c u l a r  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o n t e x t  b e f o r e  t hey  
a c q u i r e  any k ind  o f  o p e r a t i o n a l  meaning; t h e i r  u s e f u l n e s s  
depends e n t i r e l y  on a  c l e a r  r e c o g n i t i o n  of  t h e i r  conven t i ona l  
c h a r a c t e r .  
Even t h e  b e s t  d a t a  a r e  much t o o  raw t o  be used i n  an  
a n a l y t i c  argument w i t h o u t  be ing  r e f i n e d  i n t o  a  more r e l i a b l e  
and u s e f u l  form. T h i s  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  r e q u i r e s  c r a f t  s k i l l s  
t h a t  a r e  d i f f e r e n t  from t h o s e  needed i n  problem s e t t i n g  and 
i n  g a t h e r i n g  of  d a t a  by sampl ing,  expe r imen t a t i on ,  o r  u t i l i z a -  
t i o n  o f  a l r e a d y  e x i s t i n g  m a t e r i a l .  T h i s  new phase  of  t h e  
a n a l y s t ' s  work, t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  of i n fo rma t ion ,  c an  be i l l u s -  
t r a t e d  by a  number of  examples: c a l c u l a t i n g  ave rages  and 
o t h e r  s t a t i s t i c a l  pa r ame te r s ;  f i t t i n g  a  cu rve  t o  a se t  of  
p o i n t s ;  r e d u c i n g  d a t a  by means o f  some m u l t i v a r i a t e  t e c h n i q u e ;  
d e v i s i n g  s y s t e m s  o f  e q u a t i o n s  o r  i n e q u a l i t i e s  t o  r e p r e s e n t  
f u n c t i o n a l  i n t e r d e p e n d e n c i e s .  The o p e r a t i o n s  pe r fo rmed  on  
t h e  o r i g i n a l  d a t a  may b e  t e c h n i c a l l y  i n v o l v e d  o r  q u i t e  s i m p l e ,  
b u t  t h e y  a lways  r e p r e s e n t  a c r u c i a l  s t e p .  Through t h e s e  
o p e r a t i o n s ,  t h e  d a t a  are t r a n s f o r m e d  i n t o  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  a n d  
from t h i s  p o i n t  on  t h e  a n a l y s i s ,  e x c e p t  f o r  a n  o c c a s i o n a l  
c h e c k ,  i s  c a r r i e d  o u t  e x c l u s i v e l y  i n  t e r m s  o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l  
a r t i f a c t s .  
The t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  o f  d a t a  i n v o l v e s  t h r e e  b a s i c  judgments ,  
a l l  o f  which p r e s e n t  t h e  r i s k  o f  s e r i o u s  p i t f a l l s .  The f i r s t  
i s  t h a t  t h e  d a t a  r e d u c t i o n  d o e s  n o t  i n v o l v e  t o o  g r e a t  a  l o s s  
of  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  problem unde r  d i s c u s s i o n  
( g e n e r a l l y  s p e a k i n g ,  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  " s u f f i c i e n t  s t a t i s t i c s , "  
c o n t a i n i n g  t h e  same amount o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  a s  t h e  o r i g i n a l  s ample ,  
c a n n o t  b e  a s sumed) .  The second  i s  a  judgment o f  t h e  goodness  of  
f i t  o f  t h e  model t o  t h e  o r i g i n a l  d a t a .  The t h i r d  b a s i c  judg- 
ment i s  t h a t  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  t r a n s f o r m a t . i o n  o f  t h e  d a t a ,  among 
t h e  many p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  i s  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  one .  
Quade (1975 ,  p .  299) g i v e s  a n  e n t e r t a i n i n g .  example  o f  a 
p i t f a l l  i n v o l v i n g  t h e  t h i r d  t y p e  o f  judgment: t h e  u s e  o f  t h e  
a r i t h m e t i c  i n s t e a d  o f  t h e  harmonic  mean i n  comput ing  t u r n -  
a r o u n d s  o f  t r o o p  and  c a r g o  s h i p s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  s p e e d s  d u r i n g  
World War I. T h i s  i s ,  a d m i t t e d l y ,  a  r a t h e r  t r i v i a l  m i s t a k e  
( t h o u g h  a f r e q u e n t  o n e ;  see Reichman, 1961, C h a p t e r  5 ) ,  b u t  
it i s  p r e c i s e l y  i t s  e l e m e n t a r y  c h a r a c t e r  t h a t  shows how e a s y  
it i s  t o  s t u m b l e  i n t o  p i t f a l l s  i n  even  t h e  s i m p l e s t  a g g r e g a t i o n  
o f  d a t a .  Ano the r  example of  a p i t f a l l  o f  a g g r e g a t i o n  a t  a  
somewhat more advanced  l e v e l ,  is  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  " e c o l o g i c a l  
f a l l a c y , "  which h a s  r e c e i v e d  a good d e a l  o f  a t t e n t i o n  i n  t h e  
s t a t i s t i c a l  and  s o c i o l o g i c a l  l i t e r a t u r e  (Robindon,  1950; Good- 
man, 1959; A l l a r d t ,  1 9 6 9 ) .  The p i t f a l l  c o n s i s t s  i n  u s i n g  
e c o l o g i c a l  c o r r e l a t i o n s  ( i . e . ,  s t a t i s t i c a l  c o r r e l a t i o n s  i n v o l v -  
i n g  p r o p e r t i e s  of  g r o u p s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s )  a s  s u b s t i t u t e s  f o r  
i n d i v i d u a l  c o r r e l a t i o n s ,  i n  which  t h e  c o r r e l a t e s  are p r o p e r t i e s  
of i n d i v i d u a l s .  Robinson h a s  c a s t  s t r o n g  d o u b t s  o n  t h e  
v a l i d i t y  o f  a number of  e m p i r i c a l  s t u d i e s  by showing t h a t  t h e  
two c o r r e l a t i o n s  are i n  g e n e r a l  d i f f e r e n t  ( t h e y  may even  
d i f f e r  i n  s i g n ) ,  and t h a t  t h e  v a l u e s  o f  e c o l o g i c a l  c o r r e l a t i o n s  
s t r o n g l y  depend on  t h e  t y p e  of  g r o u p i n g  used .  
I n v a l i d  o r  m e a n i n g l e s s  i n f e r e n c e s  a b o u t  i n d i v i d u a l  b e h a v i o r  
f rom a g g r e g a t e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  abound i n  t h e  p l a n n i n g  l i t e r a t u r e  
( P o l a n y i ,  1 9 5 1 ) .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  g r a v i t y  models  u s e d  i n  
u r b a n  p l a n n i n g ,  w h i l e  r e a s o n a b l y  r e l i a b l e  a t  t h e  s c a l e  o f  a 
m e t r o p o l i t a n  a r e a ,  have  no  e x p l a n a t o r y  power a t  t h e  n e i g h b o r -  
hood l e v e l  t o  which  t h e y  a r e  somet imes  a p p l i e d  ( B r e w e r ,  1973; 
Lee ,  1 9 7 3 ) .  
A METHODOLOGICAL DIGRESSION 
P i t f a l l s  of a g g r e g a t i o n  and d i s a g g r e g a t i o n  a r e  c l o s e l y  
r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  l o g i c a l  f a l l a c i e s  of d i v e r s i o n  and compos i t ion .  
The f a l l a c y  of d i v i s i o n  c o n s i s t s  i n  a r g u i n g  from t h e  p remise  
t h a t  something i s  t r u e  of  some s e t  o r  c l a s s  c o n s i d e r e d  c o l l e c -  
t i v e l y  t o  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  t h e  same i s  t r u e  of t h e  p a r t s  
o r  i n d i v i d u a l  e l ements .  I n  t h e  f a l l a c y  of compos i t ion  one 
a r g u e s  from t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  of t h e  p a r t s  t o  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  of 
t h e  whole. 
I t  shou ld  b e  n o t e d  t h a t  b o t h  t y p e s  of i n f e r e n c e  a r e  per-  
f e c t l y  l e g i t i m a t e  i n  some c i rcumstances .  The p i t f a l l  c o n s i s t s  
i n  a  f a i l u r e  t o  r e a l i z e  t h a t  d i f f i c u l t i e s  may a r i s e  and t h a t  
arguments  must ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  be  s u p p l i e d  i n  o r d e r  t o  show t h a t  
a  p a r t i c u l a r  i n f e r e n c e  i s  i n  f a c t  l e g i t i m a t e .  T h i s  i s  t r u e  
i n  g e n e r a l :  i n s u f f i c i e n t  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  s p e c i f i c  c o n d i t i o n s  
under  which some p a r t i c u l a r  i n f e r e n c e  o r  a c t i o n  i s  o r  i s  n o t  
p e r m i s s i b l e  i s  t h e  common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of  a l l  p i t f a l l s .  
A few more examples w i l l  make t h i s  p o i n t  c l e a r .  
Some very  common p i t f a l l s  i n  mathematics  and s t a t i s t i c s  
a r e  connec ted  w i t h  t h e  i n t e r c h a n g e  of  a n a l y t i c  o p e r a t i o n s :  
i n t e r c h a n g e  of  t h e  o r d e r  o f  p a r t i a l  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  f o r  a  
f u n c t i o n  of  s e v e r a l  v a r i a b l e s ,  t e r m w i s e  i n t e g r a t i o n  of  d i f f e r -  
e n t i a t i o n  of  a  series,  o r  what B.O. Koopman (1956) h a s  c a l l e d  
t h e  " f a b u l o u s  law of  a v e r a g e s "  : 
where X I ,  ..., X, a r e  random v a r i a b l e s ,  f  i s  a  n o n l i n e a r  f u n c t i o n ,  
and E i s  t h e  e x p e c t e d  v a l u e  o p e r a t o r  ( f o r  a  numer ica l  i l l u s t r a -  
i o n  of  t h i s  p i t f a l l  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  a  ne tworking problem, see 
Wagner, 1975, pp. 664-665).  The s p e c i a l  c a s e  
h a s  t r a p p e d  l e g i o n s  o f  u n d e r g r a d u a t e  s t u d e n t s ,  and even some 
p o p u l a r i z e r s  of  s t a t i s t i c s  ( e . g . ,  Moroney, 1951, p.  2 5 0 ) .  
However, r e l a t i o n s  l i k e  ( 1 )  and ( 2 )  can  o c c a s i o n a l l y  be  
c o r r e c t .  Even more f r e q u e n t l y ,  t h e y  can  be  approximateZy 
r i g h t ,  and t h e  approx imat ion  may be  good enough f o r  t h e  problem 
under d i s c u s s i o n .  Thus, i f  f ( X )  i s  approx imate ly  l i n e a r  o v e r  
t h e  e n t i r e  r ange  of  v a r i a t i o n  o f  X I  a  T a y l o r  series expans ion  
a b o u t  t h e  mean shows t h a t  f ( ~ [ X l )  i s  i n d e e d  a  good approxima- 
t i o n  t o  t h e  e x a c t  v a l u e  E [ f ( X ) ] .  Analogous c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  
a p p l y  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  second moment o r  t h e  v a r i a n c e .  
The i n t e r c h a n g e  o f  l i m i t i n g  p r o c e s s e s  i s  a l s o  v a l i d  unde r  
some c o n d i t i o n s ,  namely when t h e  convergence  i s  uhi form.  Indeed ,  
un i fo rm convergence  i s  a  good example o f  a  c o n c e p t  c o n s c i o u s l y  
deve loped  (by  o u t s t a n d i n g  m a t h e m a t i c i a n s  o f  t h e  e a r l y  n i n e t e e n t h  
c e n t u r y  l i k e  Abel )  a s  a  s a f e  p a t h  t h r o u g h  a  r e g i o h  f u l l  o f  
w e l l - c o n c e a l e d  p i t f a l l s .  The mora l  o f  t h e s e  examples  is  clear:  
p i t f a l l s  r e s u l t  f rom d i s r e g a r d i n g  t h e  r a n g e  o f  v a l i d  a p p l i c a -  
b i l i t y  o f  c o n c e p t s ,  methods,  o r  t h e o r i e s  t h a t ,  i n  t h e m s e l v e s ,  
a r e  n e i t h e r  c o r r e c t  n o r  i n c o r r e c t .  L i k e  t h e  good c r a f t s m a n ,  
t h e  a n a l y s t  must  b e  a b l e  t o  r e c o g n i z e  and a c c e p t  t h e  l i m i t a -  
t i o n s  o f  h i s  t o o l s .  
TOOLS AND METHODS 
The t o o l s  o f  sys t ems  a n a l y s i s  may b e  r o u g h l y  c l a s s i f i e d  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e i r  f u n c t i o n  i n  d a t a  p r o d u c t i o n ,  m a n i p u l a t i o n ,  
o r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  The c a t e g o r y  o f  i n t e r p r e t i v e  tools  i n c l u d e s  
t o o l  d i s c i p l i n e s ,  l i k e  ma themat i c s ,  s t a t i s t i c s ,  o r  economics ,  
which t h e  a n a l y s t  h a s  t o  m a s t e r  t o  some e x t e n t  i n  o r d e r  t o  
d o  competent  work. The p i t f a l l s  a t t e n d a n t  upon t h e  u s e  o f  
p a r t i c u l a r  r e s u l t s  t a k e n  o u t  o f  t h e i r  b r o a d e r  d i s c i p l i n a r y  
c o n t e x t  have  a l r e a d y  been r e f e r r e d  t o  i n  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n .  
The d a n g e r  i s  made p a r t i c u l a r l y  a c u t e  by what  Ravetz  (1973)  
c a l l s  t h e  " p r e v a i l i n g  m e t h a p h y s i c s , "  a c c o r d i n g  t o  which t h e  
s c i e n t i f i c  c h a r a c t e r  o f  a  f i e l d  i s  assumed t o  b e  i n  d i rec t  
p r o p o r t i o n  t o  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  i t s  m a t h e m a t i c a l  f o r m a l i z a t i o n .  
A s  a  r e s u l t ,  t h e  a n a l y s t  i s  s o m e t i m e s  t empted  t o  u s e  f o r m a l  
t o o l s  t h a t  exceed  t h e  l e v e l  o f  h i s  ma themat i ca l  or s t a t i s t i c a l  
s o p h i s t i c a t i o n  and  whose r a n g e  o f  mean ingfu l  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  
h e  i s  t h e r e f o r e  i n c a p a b l e  o f  a s s e s s i n g .  
I n  d i s c i p l i n e s  w i t h  a l o n g  i n t e l l e c t u a l  t r a d i t i o n ,  t h e  
i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  new t o o l s  u s u a l l y  opens  up l i n e s  o f  r e s e a r c h  
t h a t  w e r e  p r e v i o u s l y  i n a c c e s s i b l e .  I n  newer f i e l d s ,  on t h e  
o t h e r  hand ,  w e  o f t e n  w i t n e s s  t h e  phenomenon o f  "new-tool i sm,"  
a d i s e a s e  t o  which o p e r a t i o n s  r e s e a r c h e r s  and  s y s t e m s  a n a l y s t s  
s e e m  t o  b e  p a r t i c u l a r l y  p r e d i s p o s e d .  Those a f f e c t e d  by t h i s  
d i s e a s e  "come p o s s e s s e d  o f  and  by new tools ( v a r i o u s  fo rms  o f  
m a t h e m a t i c a l  programming, v a s t  a i r - b a t t l e  s i m u l a t i o n  machine 
models ,  q u e u i n g  models  and  t h e  l i k e ) ,  and  t h e y  look  e a r n e s t l y  
f o r  a  problem t o  which one  o f  t h e s e  t o o l s  might  c o n c e i v a b l y  
a p p l y "  ( W o h l s t e t t e r ,  1970, p .  1 0 6 ) .  
I n  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  pages  w e  have s e e n  how d i f f i c u l t  it i s  
t o  o b t a i n  i n f o r m a t i o n  t h a t  i s  b o t h  r e l i a b l e  and r e l e v a n t .  
The d i f f i c u l t i e s  a r e  compounded when d a t a  are p r o c e s s e d  by  
means o f  f o r m a l  t e c h n i q u e s  and models .  Fo r  example: are t h e  
r e s u l t s  d e r i v e d  f rom a  p a r t i c u l a r  model more s e n s i t i v e  t o  
changes  i n  t h e  model and  i n  t h e  methods u s e d  t o  estimate i t s  
p a r a m e t e r s ,  o r  t o  changes  i n  t h e  d a t a ?  No g e n e r a l  answer  t o  
t h i s  c r u c i a l  q u e s t i o n  i s  a v a i l a b l e ,  and  t h e  l i m i t e d  e v i d e n c e  
i s  c o n f l i c t i n g .  Thus,  one  s t u d y  (Holden,  1969) compar ing  two 
e s t i m a t i o n  p r o c e d u r e s  ( o r d i n a r y  l e a s t  s q u a r e s  and l i m i t e d -  
i n f o r m a t i o n  maximum-likelihood two-stage l e a s t  s q u a r e s )  f o r  
a  f i v e - e q u a t i o n  economet r i c  model u s i n g  two sets of d a t a  
comes t o  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  
The v a r i a n c e s  due t o  t h e  e s t i m a t i o n  method a r e  g r e a t e r  
t h a n  t h o s e  due t o  t h e  d a t a  r e v i s i o n s ,  which i n d i c a t e s  
t h a t  t h e  c h o i c e  of  e s t i m a t i n g  p r o c e d u r e  h a s  more e f f e c t  
on t h e  pa ramete r  e s t i m a t e s  t h a n  t h e  c h o i c e  of d a t a .  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  a u t h o r s  (Denton and Kuiper ,  1965) o f  
a  s t u d y  comparing o r d i n a r y  l e a s t  s q u a r e s  and two-stage l e a s t  
s q u a r e s  f o r  a  much l a r g e r  model ( t h e  Canadian Econometric  
Model) and u s i n g  t h r e e  sets of  d a t a  f i n d  t h a t :  
V a r i a t i o n s  i n  pa ramete r  e s t i m a t e s  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  much 
g r e a t e r  between d i f f e r e n t  sets of d a t a  t h a n  between 
d i f f e r e n t  methods of  e s t i m a t i o n ,  a t  l e a s t  f o r  t h e  
model and methods used i n  t h i s  p a p e r .  
The f o l l o w i n g  example e x h i b i t s  a n o t h e r  a s p e c t  of t h e  complex 
i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p  between d a t a  and model. C 0 n s i d e r . a  l i n e a r  
r e g r e s s i o n  model 
s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  u s u a l  a s sumpt ions  c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  e r r o r  t e r m s  ui. 
The x ' s  can  r e p r e s e n t  e i t h e r  p lanned  o r  unplanned ( " p a s s i v e " )  
o b s e r v a t i o n s ;  t h e  same f o r m a l  d a t a  m a n i p u l a t i o n s  a r e  c a r r i e d  
o u t  i n  e i t h e r  c a s e .  But a s  Box (1966) h a s  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  t h e  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  f i t t e d  r e g r e s s i o n  e q u a t i o n  i s  q u i t e  d i f -  
f e r e n t  i n  t h e  two c a s e s .  I f  w e  a r e  p a s s i v e l y  o b s e r v i n g  a  
sys tem,  r a t h e r  t h a n  a c t i v e l y  exper iment ing  w i t h  it (under  
c o n t r o l l e d  c o n d i t i o n s ) ,  t h e  e r r o r  t e r m s  t y p i c a l l y  r e p r e s e n t  
t h e  e f f e c t  o f  some " l a t e n t "  v a r i a b l e s  X ~ + ~ , . . . , X ~  t h a t  canno t  
be  obse rved .  Because o f  t h i s ,  t h e  well-known phenomenon o f  
"nonsense"  c o r r e l a t i o n  may a r i s e ;  w e  can ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  
produce  a  mean ingfu l  e s t i m a t e  of  y  by means of  t h e  f i t t e d  
e q u a t i o n  b l x l  + ... + bkxk, a t  l e a s t  a s  l o n g  a s  t h e  sys tem 
c o n t i n u e s  t o  behave a s  it d i d  when t h e  o b s e r v a t i o n s  were t a k e n .  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  i f  y  a c t u a l l y  depends on l a t e n t  v a r i a b l e s  
x k + l , . . . , x m ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  on t h e  obse rved  x l ,  . . . , x k I  it would 
be  q u i t e  m i s l e a d i n g  t o  i n t e r p r e t  bi a s  t h e  e f f e c t  on y  of  a  
u n i t  change i n  x i ,  a s  w e  a r e  e n t i t l e d  t o  d o  when t h e  o b s e r v a t i o n s  
come from a  p lanned  exper iment . .  
T h i s  i s  o n l y  one o f  t h e  s e v e r a l  p i t f a l l s  i n t o  which t h e  
a n a l y s t  can  f a l l  when h e  d i s r e g a r d s  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between 
p lanned  and unplanned d a t a  (more on t h i s  p o i n t  can  be  found 
i n  Ravetz ,  1973, pp. 78-80).  
EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT 
The argument i s  t h e  l i n k  connec t ing  d a t a  and i n fo rma t ion  
w i th  t h e  conc lu s ions  of an  a n a l y t i c  s t udy .  The s t r u c t u r e  of 
t h e  argument w i l l  t y p i c a l l y  be a  complex b lend  of f a c t u a l  
s t a t e m e n t s  and s u b j e c t i v e  e v a l u a t i o n s .  Along w i t h  mathemat ica l  
and l o g i c a l  deduc t i ons ,  it w i l l  i n c l u d e  s t a t i s t i c a l ,  e m p i r i c a l ,  
and a n a l o g i c a l  i n f e r e n c e s ,  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  e x p e r t  o p i n i o n ,  
e s t i m a t e s  of  b e n e f i t s  and c o s t s ,  and c a v e a t s  and p r o v i s o s  of 
d i f f e r e n t  k inds .  T h i s  unavoidable  complexi ty  makes any formal  
t e s t i n g  of  t h e  argument q u i t e  imposs ib le .  Whatever t e s t i n g  is  
done must r e l y  on a  v a r i e t y  of  p r o f e s s i o n a l  s t a n d a r d s ,  c o r r e s -  
ponding t o  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  a n a l y t i c  methods employed; on t h e  
p l a u s i b i l i t y  and r o b u s t n e s s  of  t h e  r e s u l t s ;  and on t h e  assumed 
c r i t e r i a  of  adequacy of t h e  c l i e n t .  
The n a t u r e  of t h e  evidence  p l a y s  a  c r u c i a l  r o l e  h e r e ,  
s i n c e  a  wrong assessment  of t h e  s t r e n g t h  and f i t  o f  ev idence  
b e f o r e  it i s  i n c luded  i n  t h e  argument can  l e a d  t o  p i t f a l l s  i n  
t h e  drawing of conc lu s ions .  A s  t h e  term i s  used h e r e ,  ev idence  
i s  n o t  t h e  same a s  d a t a  o r  in fo rmat ion .  Ra ther ,  it  i s  informa- 
t i o n  s e l e c t e d  from t h e  a v a i l a b l e  s t o c k  and i n t roduced  a t  a  
s p e c i f i c  p o i n t  o f  t h e  argument i n  o r d e r  t o  pe rsuade  a  p a r t i c u l a r  
audience  of  t h e  t r u t h  o r  f a l s i t y  of  a  s t a t e m e n t  o f  f a c t .  An 
i n a p p r o p r i a t e  s e l e c t i o n  of d a t a  o r  models,  t h e i r  placement a t  
a  wrong p o i n t  i n  t h e  argument,  a  s t y l e  of  p r e s e n t a t i o n  inappro-  
p r i a t e  f o r  t h e  aud ience  t o  which t h e  argument i s  d i r ec t ed - - any  
of t h e s e  can d e s t r o y  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  i n fo rma t ion  a s  
ev idence ,  r e g a r d l e s s  of  i t s  i n t r i n s i c  c o g n i t i v e  va lue .  Hence, 
c r i t e r i a  of  a ssessment  of  -evidence  a r e  d i f f e r e n t  from t h o s e  
a p p l i c a b l e  t o  " f a c t s . "  W h i l e  f a c t s  can be e v a l u a t e d  i n  terms 
of a b s t r a c t  l o g i c a l  canons ,  t h e  a c c e p t a b i l i t y  of ev idence  
depends on a  number of  f a c t o r s  p e c u l i a r  t o  a  g iven  s i t u a t i o n ,  
l i k e  t h e  n a t u r e  of t h e  c a s e ,  t h e  type  o f  aud ience ,  t h e  p re -  
v a i l i n g  " r u l e s  of  ev idence , " .  and even t h e  p e r s u a s i v e n e s s  of 
t h e  a n a l y s t .  
The ca t ego ry  of  ev idence  has  r e ce ived  l i t t l e  a t t e n t i o n  
i n  t h e  n a t u r a l  s c i e n c e s ,  and,  perhaps  because  of t h i s ,  it 
has  a l s o  been neg l ec t ed  i n  methodologica l  d i s c u s s i o n s  of  
systems a n a l y s i s .  The two s i t u a t i o n s  a r e  d i f f e r e n t  i n  t h i s  
a s  i n  o t h e r  r e s p e c t s ,  and what i s  j u s t i f i a b l e  i n  t h e  one 
c a s e  is  a  s e r i o u s  p i t f a l l  i n  t h e  o t h e r .  Ravetz ( 1 9 7 3 )  p o i n t s  
o u t  t h a t  n e i t h e r  d e s c r i p t i v e  nor  t h e o r e t i c a l  n a t u r a l  s c i e n c e s  
r e q u i r e  h i g h l y  developed s k i l l s  i n  t e s t i n g  ev idence ,  beyond 
t h e  tests a l r e a d y  invo lved  i n  producing i n fo rma t ion ,  f o r  
h e r e  one u s u a l l y  h a s  e i t h e r  a  l a r g e  mass of i n fo rma t ion  w i t h  
a  r e l a t i v e l y  s imple  argument o r  a  complex argument needing 
ev idence  a t  on ly  a  few p o i n t s .  However, t h e r e  a r e  f i e l d s  
where problems t y p i c a l l y  i nvo lve  both  complex arguments and 
l a r g e  masses of d a t a  and where t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  and r e l e v a n c e  
o f  i n fo rma t ion  i t s e l f  canno t  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  be t r u s t e d .  Law 
and h i s t o r y  a r e  two such f i e l d s ,  and h e r e  ev idence  ha s  been 
e x p l i c i t l y  recogn ized  a s  an  autonomous concep tua l  c a t e g o r y .  
The same cannot be said of systems analysis, even though com- 
plexity of arguments and large amounts of data of doubtful 
reliability and relevance characterize analytic studies as 
well. 
Among the most widespread pitfalls encountered in ana- 
lytical studies in connection with argument and evidence, 
three deserve special notice. The first one originates in 
the contemporary fashion of using mathematical formalizations 
on every possible occasion. Kahn and Mann (1957,  p. 47) 
observe that: 
The analyst often dresses up his results and attempts, 
either consciously or unconsciously, to hide fairly 
elementary notions in extreme mathematical and tech- 
nical language. Though it is probably not possible to 
condense the most esoteric results of modern mathematics 
and physics into the language of the newspapers, this 
is just not true of any applied operations analyses 
that we have seen. 
It should be added that an overly formalized style of pre- 
sentation not only obscures the real issues and impedes 
assessment of the plausibility of the conclusions; it also 
induces a tendency to accept statistical information or the 
results of mathematical calculations as facts rather than 
evidence. 
The second group of pitfalls is encountered when existing 
information is taken over for use in an analytic argument. 
All kinds of distortions occur when data gathered by one 
organization for broadly defined purposes are used by others 
to support specific conclusions (for some of the organizational 
problems involved, see Plorgenstern, 1963, pp. 11-12). Whether 
such material is of sufficient strength and fit for its 
function in the argument depends on the mode of its original 
production, and this is often difficult for the analyst to 
assess and usually impossible for him to change. 
Finally, questions concerning the acceptable degree of 
approximation of a numerical result or the acceptable level 
of precision of a set of data acquire their full meaning, 
for systems analysts at any rate, in connection with the use 
of evidence. Two pitfalls should be mentioned in this con- 
text: the belief that there is an absolute standard of 
adequacy, and the rejection of items of information or opinions 
for which consensus among the experts is lacking. The belief 
in absolute standards overlooks the fact that even the physical 
sciences use several degrees of acceptable levels of precision 
for their data simultaneously. For example, some physical 
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constants are known with an accuracy of 10 , while the age of 
the earth can only be estimated with an error of billions of 
years. Because of the diversity of the data used in a typical 
analytic study, the acceptable margins of error may have to be 
even  l a r g e r  t h a n  t h o s e  t h e  economis t  o r  t h e  s o c i o l o g i s t  must  
r e a l i s t i c a l l y  a c c e p t .  T h i s  d o e s  n o t  mean, o f  c o u r s e ,  t h a t  t h e  
s y s t e m s  a n a l y s t  s h o u l d  n o t  have h i g h  s t a n d a r d s  of  q u a l i t y  f o r  
h i s  e v i d e n c e .  The p i t f a l l  c o n s i s t s  i n  s e t t i n g  t h e  s t a n d a r d s  
s o  h i g h  t h a t  t h e y  become s e l f - d e f e a t i n g .  
YODELS AS EVIDENCE 
L a r g e - s c a l e ,  p o l i c y - o r i e n t e d  models  have  come unde r  
i n c r e a s i n g  c r i t i c i sm i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s .  Examples o f  c o n c e p t u a l ,  
t e c h n i c a l ,  and  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  p i t f a l l s  i n  model c o n s t r u c t i o n  
and  u t i l i z a t i o n  c a n  b e  found  i n  a  number o f  p e r c e p t i v e  r e v i e w  
p a p e r s  (Shubik  and  B r e w e r ,  1972; Lee,  1973;  A l l e n ,  1975; 
B r e w e r ,  1975)  and  i n  book- l eng th  c a s e  s t u d i e s  ( B r e w e r ,  1973;  
Ackerman e t  a l . ,  1974; F e i v e s o n  -- e t  a l . ,  1 9 7 6 ) .  
Among t h e  mode l ing  e f f o r t s  d i s c u s s e d  by t h e s e  w r i t e r s ,  
t h e  Delaware E s t u a r y  Comprehensive S t u d y  examined by Bruce  
Ackerman and ' c o a u t h o r s  i s  p r o b a b l y  t h e  most  t h o r o u g h  and  
compe ten t .  Y e t  even  t h i s  s t u d y  i s  marred  by a  number o f  
s e r i o u s  p i t f a l l s  r a n g i n g  from u s e  o f  d i s s o l v e d  oxygen a s  t h e  
s o l e  i n d i c a t o r  o f  w a t e r  q u a l i t y  and n e g l e c t  o f  peak  d i s c h a r g e s  
o f  sewage when heavy r a i n s  o v e r l o a d  t h e  sewers, t o  i n c o r r e c t  
e s t i m a t i o n  o f  r e c r e a t i o n a l  b e n e f i t s  and f a i l u r e  t o  c a l l  
a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  g r e a t  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  o f  t h e s e  and  o t h e r  
e s t i m a t e s .  
The main c o n c l u s i o n  t o  b e  d e r i v e d  from t h e s e  c r i t i c a l  
r e v i e w s  c a n  p e r h a p s  b e  summarized by t h e  s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  
models  d o  n o t ,  and  c a n n o t ,  p r o v i d e  a n s w e r s  t o  p o l i c y  ques -  
t i o n s .  Under s u i t a b l e  a n a l y t i c  and  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o n d i t i o n s  
t h e y  c a n ,  however ,  s u p p l y  e v i d e n c e  t h a t ,  t o q e t h e r  w i t h  o t h e r  
i n f o r m a t i o n ,  i n t e l l e c t u a l  c o n s t r u c t S ,  and  s u b j e c t i v e  judgments ,  
c a n  b e  used  i n  a rgumen t s  s u p p o r t i n g  a  p o l i c y  c o n c l u s i o n .  
The p a t h  f rom model t o  c o n c l u s i o n s  i s  lohcj, i n v o l v e d ,  and 
b e s e t  by d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  a l l  k i n d s  a s  L e e  (1973 ,  p.  167)  h a s  
p o i n t e d  o u t :  
L a r g e  models  a r e  n o t  s i m p l y  c o n s t r u c t e d  and  o p e r a t e d ;  
t h e y  mus t  b e  "massaged" i n t o  b e i n g ,  f i r s t  t o  make them 
o p e r a t e  a t  a l l  and  t h e n  t o  g e t  s e n s i b l e  o u t p u t .  I n e v i t a b l y  
t h i s  r e q u i r e s  numerous s p e c i a l  f e a t u r e s  i n  t h e  computer  
program t h a t  keep  t h e  model from g o i n g  o u t  ~f fiounds,  s o  
t h a t  o u t p u t  d e s c r i b e d  a s  " r e a s o n a b l e "  i s  a  s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g  
t a u t o l o g y .  The model p r o d u c e s  r e a s o n a b l e  r e s u l t s  b e c a u s e  
i t s  b u i l d e r s  imposed c o n s t r a i n t s  o n  t h e  m o d e l ' s  o p e r a t i o n  
t h a t  p r e v e n t e d  it f rom p r o d u c i n g  a n y t h i n g  else. Because  
t h e  models  c o n t a i n  l a r g e  b u t  unknown amounts  o f  error 
and  t h e y  a r e  t o o  complex,  and t h e r e  a r e  no e v a l u a t i o n  
m e a s u r e s ,  m o d e l e r s  have  l i t t l e  c h o i c e  e x c e p t  t o  f u d g e  t h e  
models  i n t o  shape .  
To produce acceptable evidence, models must satisfy certain 
procedural requirements that make assessment of their output 
possible; they have to be "in proper form," as lawyers would 
say. Actually, the legal analogy is quite appropriate in 
this context, for it reminds us that the assessment of argu- 
ments is an activity necessarily involving formalities. It 
is not enough for an effective argument to have a particular 
shape, like the mathematical qarb of a formal model. After 
all, a mathematical style of presentation is not incompatible 
with a "black box" approach (it may even encourage it), and 
black box models, as Lee points out (1973, p. 175), "will 
never have an impact on policy other than through mystique, 
and this will be short lived and self-defeating." 
Brewer (1975) and Ackermann and coauthors (1974) among 
others, have stressed the need for developing institutional 
mechanisms for assessing modeling activities in terms of 
internal validity as well as policy relevance. But an effective 
appraisal function requires that analytic arguments be set 
out and presented in a sequence of steps conforming to certain 
basic rules of procedure, like those that hold when questions 
of law are debated in a court. The legal scholar asks: What 
different sorts of propositions are uttered in the course of a 
law case, and in what different ways can such propositions 
bear on the soundness of a legal claim?" Without the large 
number of distinctions that he introduces (statements of claim, 
evidence of different types, testimony, proof of facts, pre- 
sumptions, interpretation of a statute or discussion of its 
validity, verdicts, sentences), it is impossible to understand 
the nature of the legal process (Toulmin, 1964). 
The intrinsic complexity of policy analysis certainly 
matches that of legal argumentation. Hence, while it is 
important to insist that models be transparent and as simple 
as possible, more detailed procedural guidelines will have 
to be developed if models are to play their limited but potenti- 
ally useful role in the policy process. It is ironic that 
while data generation absorbs so much of the modelers' time 
and ingenuity, the transition from these data to conclusions 
should be accomplished by arguments that often do not bear 
close scrutiny. No amount of technical skill can compensate 
for a lack of sophistication in the structuring of arguments 
or for carelessness in drawing the necessary distinctions 
between data, information, supporting evidence, and conclusions. 
CONCLUSION, COMMUNICATION, IMPLEMENTATION 
The conclusion of an analytic study may be a forecast, an 
issue paper, a recommended course of action, or an assessment 
of ongoing policies. Whatever its nature, a conclusion is 
never concerned with "things themselves" but with those 
intellectually constructed concepts and categories that can 
serve as the objects of an argument. The contact with the 
external world of economic, social, technical, and political 
phenomena is always indirect and elusive. A different con- 
ceptualization of the problem situation, different tools or 
models, or a few different subjective judgments made at crucial 
points of the analysis can lead to quite different conclusions. 
This is true of any form of intellectual inquiry, including 
the natural sciences. But in science the pitfalls encountered 
when a conceptual system makes contact with reality can be 
detected, before too much harm is done, by various means, 
including controlled experiments, that reduce the abruptness of 
the impact. 
Paradoxically, uncritical acceptance of the "scientific 
method" as the model that systems analysts should strive to 
imitate only generates disillusionment when it is realized 
that the conclusions of analysis suffer from the same limita- 
tions as those of science, without sharing their strengths. 
In fact, the references to science that figure so prominently, 
for instance, in the official definitions of operations research 
are not so much methodological indications as they are ideological 
props. They attempt to increase the collective confidence of 
a group of new disciplines striving for academic and social 
recognition; they do not direct attention to any deep intellec- 
tual affinities. But in order to be used as an ideology, 
science has to be viewed as the incessant accumulation of 
indisputable facts and timeless truths. The obscurity of its 
foundations, the artificiality of its objects of inquiry, the 
tentative character of its conclusions must all be forgotten. 
What remains--those finished products that find their way 
into textbooks and strike the popular imagination--is no 
longer science but, rather, folk-science, i.e., "a part of a 
general worldview, or ideology, which is given special articu- 
lation so that it may provide comfort and reassurance in the 
face of crucial uncertainties of the world of experience" 
(Ravetz, 1973, p. 386). 
Basically, lack of appreciation of the problems of communi- 
cation and persuasion--the pitfall that Kahn and Pllann (1957) 
have called hermitism--stems from a misconception of both 
science and systems analysis. For only the believer in apo- 
dictic certainties can scorn the techniques of persuasion. 
Fallible conclusions must fight for acceptance before they 
can affect the course of events. 
The natural and social sciences offer many examples of 
theories whose correctness, according to the usual scientific 
standards, was established only gradually, and only after 
people had become convinced of their values through more 
"irrational" methods of support. Thus, according to modern 
interpretations (Feyerabend, 1975, p. 1411, Galilee's advocacy 
of Copernicanism was eventually successful not because of any 
decisive proof he could adduce (even his telescope would 
produce only conflicting evidence), but 
... because of his style and his clever techniques of 
persuasion, because he writes in Italian rather than 
in Latin, and because he appeals to people who are 
temperamentally opposed to the old ideas and the 
standards of learning connected with them. 
Discussing Adam Smith's principles of division of labor and 
free exchange, Alchian and Allen (1974, p. 200) write: 
It is interesting that Smith's book did not contain a 
logically correct exposition; instead it contained a 
masterfully persuasive statement of the results of 
free exchange. It was Robert Torrens, who some forty 
years after the idea had been "sold," demonstrated its 
logical validity. Possibly, had Smith tried to give a 
logically air-tight demonstration, instead of a sugges- 
tive plausible interpretation, he would never have made 
his "point" popular. 
Stigler (1955) also mentions the use of techniques of persuasion 
in the realm of ideas and gives other examples of famous econ- 
omists who "have employed the techniques of the huckster." 
If communication and persuasion are important for the 
acceptance of theoretical results, they become crucial in 
systems analysis. In fact, to avoid pitfalls of communication 
that may endanger the practical relevance of the entire study 
(some examples are discussed in Quade, 1975, pp. 312-317), 
analysis should be done in two stages: a first stage to find 
out what one wants to recommend, and a second stage to make 
the recommendations convincing "even to a hostile and dis- 
believing, but intelligent audience" (Kahn and Mann, 1956). 
Notice that the two stages must be viewed as closely inter- 
dependent, rather than as discrete and separate analytic com- 
ponents. As we have seen, the plausibility of a conclusion 
depends on the structure of the supporting argument and on 
the strength and fit of the evidence used in it. 
The same need to consider simultaneously the different 
aspects of the analytic process arises in connection with 
problems of implementation. For all its obvious importance, 
implementation remains the terra incognita of systems analysis, 
and the few explorers who have ventured into it have accomplished 
little more than a first reconnaissance of the terrain. Without 
sufficient empirical material for a detailed discussion of 
pitfalls of implementation, we shall have to limit ourselves to 
suggesting an explanation of why problems of implementation 
have not yet found a satisfactory formulation, let alone 
practical solution, in systems analysis. 
I shall argue that the main fallacy responsible for this 
state of affairs is the excessive reliance of many analysts on 
normative decision models and the pure logic of choice, on 
analysis rather than synthesis and design. This is particularly 
evident in the work of analysts raised in the normative spirit 
of contemporary economics and decision theory (Majone, 1 9 7 5 ) .  
Of course, this criticism is relevant only for applied studies. 
The theorist does not need to distinguish between decision 
and action: if the decision does not lead to the corresponding 
act, it is because something occurred to prevent it, and a new 
decision problem arises (Lindley, 1 9 7 1 ) .  But this is a purely 
formal solution, of no help whatsoever for understanding the 
relationship between decision and action. 
What, then, is the intrinsic limitation of normative 
models? Basically, it is this: the prescriptions and operating 
rules provided by such models set standards by which behavior 
can be evaluated, but they cannot explain deviations from the 
norms, nor can they indicate the means of correcting them. 
Suppose that the behavior of the system under investigation 
does not conform to the conditions of the model, perhaps 
because some previously ignored constraints must now be taken 
into consideration. Is it possible, within the context of 
the model, to understand the causes of the deviations, or to 
deduce the conditions for a secondbest solution from those for 
the original optimum? In general, the answer is no, and this 
is proved, at least for problems of economic policy, by the 
second-best theorem of welfare economics (Lipsey and Lancaster, 
1956-1  957)  . 
This theorem shows that the normative rules for a Pareto 
optimum are not valid policy criteria in a situation where 
they are not all simultaneously satisfied. To achieve a , 
second-best position it may, in fact, be necessary to violate 
even those rules that could have been satisfied. In other 
words, the common assumption that it is better to fulfill at 
least some of the optimum conditions rather than none turns 
out to be false. Hence, while the normative model gives 
precise conditions for an optimal or best position, there is 
no corresponding set of rules for the achievement of a 
second-best, or even a better position, in a world where the 
optimum is unattainable. 
The situation described here is by no means peculiar to 
welfare economics. The same is true, for example, in the 
field of technology. The operational principles of a machine 
set a standard: the ideal of a machine in good working 
order. The principles become "rules of rightness" that 
account for the successful working of a machine but leave 
its occasional failures unexplained (Polanyi, 1 9 6 2 ) .  The 
following remarks by two control theorists (Gumowski and 
Mira, 1 9 6 8 )  also point in the same direction: 
If a mathematical model of a practical system is 
based on highly idealized elements, this model will 
apply, only if the design of the practical system has 
been carried to a successful completion. In other 
words, it will apply only after the designer has 
eliminated all possible causes of trouble. If the 
practical system does not yet operate properly, its 
mathematical model composed of idealized elements will 
not offer any clue permitting to locate the cause of 
trouble... . Even a superficial analysis will show 
that a very substantial part of contemporary control 
theory ... has relatively little to offer to the 
practical designer. In particular, it is not of 
much help in the selection of practical components 
permitting one to attain a given design goal. 
Perhaps the problem of implementation is so difficult to 
formulate simply because it does not exist as something that 
can be factored out of all the other aspects of the policy 
process. Belief in its separate existence results from the 
normative tenet that full articulation of a plan should pre- 
cede its institutional realization. In fact, "creation of 
a t h i n g ,  and creation plus full understanding of a c o r r e c t  
i d e a  of the thing, a r e  v e r y  o f t e n  p a r t s  o f  one  and t h e  same 
i n d i v i s i b l e  p r o c e s s  and cannot be separated without bringing 
the process to a stop" (Feyerabend, 1975, p. 26). Uncritical 
acceptance of the metaphysical distinction between idea and 
action is probably the most serious pitfall of applied systems 
analysis. 
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